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 Historians remain animated by the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s, and with good 
reason. According to Landon R. Y. Storrs, anti-communist hysteria “stunted the development of 
the American welfare state” by forcing the resignation—and/or ideological reorientation—of 
many left-leaning civil servants (p. 1). In a similar vein, James C. Clark demonstrates how the 
1950 Florida Senate primary resulted in the replacement of Claude Pepper, an ardent New 
Dealer, with George Smathers, a Democratic standpatter. Together, these two historians explore 
separately how issues of race, class, and gender intersected with anti-communism to heighten a 
politics of fear and narrow the range of policy choices available to federal officials. Their books 
also highlight the philosophical, political, and personal costs of the post-1945 Red Scare. 
 The personal and political aspects of the Red Scare assume center-stage in Clark’s Red 
Pepper and Gorgeous George. Claude Pepper’s defeat at the hands of George Smathers in 
Florida’s 1950 Senate Democratic primary is the stuff of legend. Exploiting Pepper’s support for 
organized labor, an array of federal domestic programs, and a conciliatory approach toward the 
Soviet Union, Smathers tagged him the “Red Pepper” (p. 121). The young, handsome, and 
aggressive Smathers won the primary, a seat in the Senate, and a long-term, indelible reputation 
as “the South’s Golden Hatchetman” (p. 155). In one speech, he allegedly tapped into the 
ignorance of Floridians: “Are you aware that Claude Pepper is known all over Washington as a 
shameless extrovert? Not only that, but this man is reliably reported to practice nepotism with his 
sister-in-law, and he has a sister who was once a thespian in wicked New York. Worst of all, it is 
an established fact that Mr. Pepper before his marriage habitually practiced celibacy” (p. 150). 
As Clark explains, the speech was fiction, the product of an imaginative reporter for Time bent 
on showing that “Smathers was capable of going to any length in campaigning” (p. 151). Partly 
as a result, a “consensus” of observers later came to view Pepper as a saintly figure “victimized 
by a brutal, unfair opponent” (p. 155). 
 To correct the record, Clark paints a nuanced portrait of Pepper and Smathers. Pepper was 
a candidate weakened by self-inflicted wounds. The senator alienated doctors when he backed 
national health insurance, civil rights advocates when he championed white supremacy, racists 
when he voted to continue the Fair Employment Practices Commission, and business leaders 
when he opposed the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act. Pepper also made powerful enemies when he 
broke with Florida businessman Ed Ball and resisted President Harry S. Truman’s nomination in 
1948. Truman, in revenge, encouraged Smathers to challenge Pepper in 1950. By the late 1940s, 
Pepper had lost touch with constituents and the national mood, a fact accentuated by his often 
naïve pronouncements on Soviet-American relations. Between 1945 and 1946, he called for 
peaceful coexistence between the two countries, favored a loan for Russia, attacked British 
(rather than Soviet) imperialism, hailed Josef Stalin as “one of the great men of history,” and 
proclaimed himself a “friend of the Soviet people” (p. 44). But an intensifying Cold War, along 
with Pepper’s ambition for national office, prompted a change of course. In a political 
switcheroo worthy of John Kerry (or, on second thought, Mitt Romney), Pepper criticized 
Truman’s aid package for Greece and Turkey, then promised to vote for the measure, and then 
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did not. Following the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948, he denounced the 
“Russian onslaught,” advocated increased expenditure on arms, and endorsed the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. But, as Clark argues, it was “too little, too late” (p. 95). Pepper’s newspaper 
support in Florida had dwindled, and Smathers “ran a brilliant, flawless campaign” against him 
(p. 155).  
 Clark has written a savvy, persuasive book. His command of Florida politics is expert, and 
he has an eye for the ironies of American politics. Smathers served three terms in the Senate 
where he was little more than an empty-suit—someone so vacuously affable that he managed to 
befriend both John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon. “He remains best remembered for the 1950 
campaign,” Clark concludes, “and perhaps for the speech he never gave” (p. 167). Pepper, in 
contrast, won a seat in the U. S. House of Representatives in 1962, chaired the Rules Committee, 
and defended Social Security, the New Deal’s signature reform, until his death in 1989. In his 
later years, Pepper refrained from addressing foreign policy issues except with respect to Cuba, 
for his South Florida district contained numerous émigrés from Fidel Castro’s regime. On that 
issue, the man once derided as the “Red Pepper” had morphed into a staunch anti-communist. 
 Reinvention is also one of the themes in Storrs’ The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking 
of the New Deal Left. The author considers how the federal government’s loyalty program 
ensnared sub-cabinet officials of leftist persuasion, often forcing them to deny, alter, or conceal 
their core convictions. The book has a haunting tenor as one witnesses a recurring cycle of 
accusation, investigation, defense, dismissal (or resignation), shame, and silence. Among the 
“prime targets of the anticommunist right” were Leon Keyserling, chair of Truman’s Council for 
Economic Advisers, and his wife, Mary Dublin Keyserling, an economist at the Department of 
Commerce (p. 107). Investigators at the House Un-American Activities Committee and Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee chased hearsay about the Keyserlings’ supposed Communist 
associations. They were not Communists but pro-labor progressives who had been entranced by 
socialism and sought to reform capitalism by increasing the purchasing power of the masses. 
They were guilty, not of disloyalty to the United States, but of supporting programs such as the 
Marshall Plan (which right-wingers disliked as socialistic, state-centered planning), of being 
close to Truman during an era of hyper-partisanship, and of being married to each other. Many 
conservatives equated professional women and feminists like Dublin Keyserling with the 
disruption of traditional gender roles. The Keyserlings’ story consumes two chapters—the heart 
of the book—as Storrs explores charges against them, their defense, their appeals, and their 
resignations. The Keyserlings refrained from discussing their ordeal as they drifted into the 
ideological mainstream, becoming Lyndon Johnson Democrats “who favored Cold War military 
spending, backed U.S. policy in Vietnam, and argued that poverty could be eliminated through 
economic growth rather than redistribution” (p. 147). The “transformation of these New Dealers 
into Cold War liberals” recurred in numerous other cases which Storrs recounts in exhaustive 
and, for this reader, exhausting detail (p. 176). 
 Storrs achieves much in The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left. 
She demonstrates the extent to which anti-feminism, anti-socialism, and anti-labor sentiments 
drove the anti-communist crusade. She documents a pattern in which many loyalty defendants 
expunged material about their ordeals from their private papers. And she captures the trauma that 
loyalty investigations inflicted on individuals and the federal bureaucracy. But Storrs fails to 
prove two of her arguments. For example, the degree to which loyalty investigations caused 
individuals to shift ideological direction is uncertain; the transformation of New Deal leftists into 
postwar liberals may not be as pronounced, self-interested, or awkward as Storrs implies given 
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both groups’ aversion to totalitarianism, commitment to activist democratic governance, and 
engagement with Cold War realities. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the “loyalty program’s 
constricting effect on public policy” (p. 2). No doubt, the harassment of left-leaning officials 
chilled dissent, removed socialists from government, and narrowed policy debates. But would 
those who departed government have been able to shift public policy in fundamental ways? If 
Felix S. Cohen (another of Storrs’ case studies) had remained at the Department of the Interior, 
would he have been able to halt the federal government’s postwar efforts to terminate Indian 
tribes? Would he even have tried to do so, given the continuities between the supposedly tribal-
friendly Indian New Deal of the 1930s and the tribal-hostile policy of termination that prevailed 
during the 1950s and 1960s? It is extremely doubtful. 
 Like Storrs, Clark at times claims too much for his subject. Clark credits George Smathers, 
rather than Joe McCarthy, with pioneering the use of anti-communism in political campaigns. 
But he overlooks Richard Nixon’s House race against Jerry Voorhis in 1946 and the earlier red-
baiting of Texas Democrat Martin Dies—a topic covered by Storrs. Clark furthermore asserts 
that Nixon’s 1950 Senate contest against Helen Gahagan Douglas was “a carbon copy of the 
Florida election” (p. 161). That is not true because, unlike in the Pepper-Smathers showdown, 
Nixon’s attacks also alluded to the issue of gender as he dubbed Douglas the “Pink Lady” (p. 
162). An appreciation of the nexus between anti-feminism and anti-communism—a theme 
emphasized by Storrs—would have saved Clark from this error. Yet even when Storrs and Clark 
stretch and strain in their arguments, they force readers to ponder the myriad dimensions and 
harmful ramifications of the Second Red Scare. At a time when respect for civil liberties in 
America seems tenuous, these provocative books deserve a wide audience. 
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